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Whiteness in Du Bois's
The Souls of Black Folk
David S. Owen
Department of Philosophy
University of Louisville
W. E. B. Du Bois's work is often cited as an early precursor to the contemporary
field of critical whiteness studies. Du Bois is famous in this regard for his claim in
Black Reconstruction that despite being underpaid, white workers also received
a "public and a psychological wage" for being white, and for his essay examining the "souls of white folk." Both writings are often referenced as evidence for
Du Bois's interest in critically analyzing whiteness.' The fundamental outlines of an
analysis of whiteness, however, can be found in a close reading of his much earlier
The Souls of Black Folk, and especially in the opening chapter, "Of Our Spiritual Strivings," wherein he introduces the key concepts of double consciousness
and the Veil for understanding aspects of the black experience under conditions
of white supremacy.^ In this paper I argue that in Souls Du Bois, at the same time
he is expressly analyzing the experience of blackness, is also implicitly describing
and analyzing whiteness. The consequence of indirectly uncovering and analyzing
whiteness is to bring to the attention of his white readers the depth and pervasiveness of white supremacy in the United States. There are four aspects of Souls that
I will focus on in developing this interpretation: (1) Du Bois's discussion in the
opening paragraphs of blacks being "a problem"; (2) the concept of double-consciousness; (3) the figure of the Veil; and (4) the shaping of Souls for an audience
of whites. I will argue that throughout this groundbreaking, interdisciplinary work
Du Bois is implicitly describing the nature, structure, and significance of whiteness.
Although Du Bois's stated intention is to describe the experience of blackness, he
recognizes that a comprehensive examination requires attention to the conceptual
other of whiteness, which because of its being normalized structures, shapes, and
constrains the expression of blackness.
It should be noted, however, that my aim in reading the ways whiteness is
encoded in Souls is not to re-center whiteness and whites in the original and important work of an African-American thinker. Rather, I seek to show that in Souls
Du Bois had already identified whiteness as an important framework of analysis
for the critique and dismantling of structures of white supremacy. I suggest that
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Du Bois understood the relational nature of blackness and whiteness and that
interrogating one necessarily involves reflecting on the other. I argue that, as his
analysis of double-consciousness shows, black identity is mediated through whiteness; it is fundamentally shaped by the racial order of white supremacy in which it
is formed. And of course conversely, as other writers have shown, white identity is
also formed by means of a mediation through blackness.^ Given his extensive study
of the German philosophical tradition, it should not be surprising that Du Bois
understood that in order to accurately depict the souls of black folk, he needed to
also examine the nature and effects of whiteness. Because of their relational nature,
he couldn't consider one without at the same time considering the other. Du Bois's
radically re-framing of the understanding of race in America in terms of whiteness
and its relationship to blackness thus does not re-center whites and whiteness—it
is essential to adequately understanding and critiquing white supremacy. By destabilizing the hegemony of whiteness through exposing it as the unquestioned norm,
Du Bois generates a new framework for the critique of white supremacy.

On Being a Problem: Unmasking Whiteness
In the opening paragraph of "Of Our Spiritual Strivings," Du Bois describes
the experience of being perceived to be a problem:
Between me and the other world there is ever an unasked question: unasked by some through feelings of delicacy; by others
through the difficulty of rightly framing it. All, nevertheless, fiutter
round it. They approach me in a half-hesitant sort of way, eye me
curiously or compassionately, and then, instead of saying directly.
How does it feel to be a problem? they say, I know an excellent
colored man in my town; or, I fought at Mechanicsville; or. Do not
these Southern outrages make your blood boil? At these I smile, or
am interested, or reduce the boihng to a simmer, as the occasion
may require. To the real question. How does it feel to be a problem? I answer seldom a word {Souls, 7).
The "other world" that asks this persistent question is not identified immediately,
but since the author has already identified the subject of the work as "the strange
meaning of being black here in the dawning of the Twentieth Gentury," the reference of the "other world" can hardly be anything but the world of whites {Souls,
3). Thus, Du Bois immediately opens Souls by identifying the background framework—a racial framework—that defines the horizons that delimit his descriptions
and elaborations of the "meaning of being black." In light of this preexisting framing, asking this question of Du Bois from the perspective of the black experience
would be senseless since, being black, one would either know what it felt like to be
a problem—assuming the premise that one is a problem—or reject this very premise—that is, that one is a problem.
To be sure, this is a false dichotomy because the effects of internalized racism
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might result in blacks asking the same question. Since the intelligibility of the question presupposes a particular set of presuppositions about the social world, Du Bois
is not merely marking the questioner's identity as white, he is in addition drawing
attention to the perspective of the questioner as a white perspective, the meaning of
which will be examined below. Moreover, since Du Bois has already announced his
intention in the "The Forethought" of Souls to discuss "the problem of the color
line," the "other world" that is set against him is undoubtedly the white world,
which must be understood in terms of its perspective {Souls, 3). At the very outset,
then, Du Bois announces, if indirectly, his intention to examine not only blackness,
or what it means to be black, but also whiteness, and the meaning of this "other"
term. Embedded within this brief paragraph, then, is the central claim that whites
and blacks occupy two very different social realities and that understanding one
requires understanding the other, as well as the relations between the two.
But is this all that this brief description of the question of what it is like to be
a problem accomplishes? Does it merely announce indirectly the racially dyadic
framing of the analyses to follow? Merely referencing the existence of two racialized social worlds that are at odds with each other (at least epistemically) would
hardly be especially significant. In this paragraph, Du Bois is also addressing what
might be called the problem of the black voice and the expression of the black experience, where the problem of the black voice is most fundamentally the problem
of the lack of a black voice in the public sphere and dominant culture. Du Bois's
framing of this question in terms of two distinct lifeworlds with different perspectives does the work of clearing a discursive space of expression and thereby opening up the possibility of articulating the black American experience from behind
the Veil. In responding to the reviews of Souls a year after its publication, Du Bois
stated that while readers may disagree with him, "at the same time some revelation
of how the world looks to me cannot easily escape him [i.e., the reader]."''
It is clear, then, both from its title and from this statement that one of Du Bois's
objectives in the publication of Souls was to describe the experience of being black
in the U.S. in the late nineteenth century to the occupants on the other side of the
color line, those living in the white lifeworld. But before such an experience can
be expressed, a discursive space needs to be cleared; for without such a clearing,
Du Bois's descriptions of the black experience would fall on the deaf ears of whites
either as not credible—simply dismissed as the rantings of an angry black man, or
an "uppity Negro" who doesn't know his place, or how good he's got it, or simply
as incomprehensible. Du Bois accomplishes this clearing of a discursive space in
which his descriptions of black experience can both be understood and taken seriously by whites by attempting to uncover and unmask the implicit presuppositions
that shape the white sociocultural lifeworld. Once these presuppositions are called
into question, something Du Bois does in an indirect manner, the legitimacy and
credibility of an expression of the black experience is at least made possible for his
white readership.
Du Bois underscores the norming of the presuppositions of whiteness in the
dominant cultural worldview by describing the white world as that "other world."
This is a quite significant, yet overlooked, trope. By othering the white world.
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Du Bois reverses tbe typical perspective on matters of race by shifting tbe point
of view from tbe wbite to tbe black perspective, from dominant to marginalized
worldview. This contrasts starkly with previous articulations of the black experience for wbite consumption in whicb autbors sucb as Frederick Douglass and
Booker T. Wasbington adopted wbat is called an "assimilationist" strategy in tbe
sense tbat they sought to convince wbite readers tbat blacks had all of the cognitive, emotional, and spiritual experiences tbat whites do, and bence ought to be
included in tbe (wbite) social world as full persons. Tbus, in tbe dominant cultural
discourse of tbe time (and of today), tbe Otber would represent blacks and tbe
self-same would represent whites, witb tbe consequence tbat tbe perspective, interests, needs, and values of wbites are normed. Du Bois, however, reverses tbis usual
structure in order to create in bis readers (and most especially in bis wbite readers)
a kind of cognitive dissonance, tbus generating tbe necessary discursive space for
tbe credible expression of tbe black experience.
Ratber tban answering tbe hovering question of bow it feels to be a problem,
Du Bois describes to bis readers the experience and implications of always baving tbis question as tbe background to any interactions across tbe color line. By
taking this approacb of not answering tbe question directly, be rejects tbe implicit
assumption of tbe question: tbat blacks are tbe cause of, and responsible for, tbe
problem of race. By redirecting tbe readers' attention to tbe experience of having
tbe question always in tbe background, Du Bois draws attention to tbe normalized
racial presuppositions tbat frame the question. Du Bois's language and structure
bere suggest tbat tbe problem is with being seen as a problem, tbat is, witb tbe
very conceptual framework presumed by tbe question. It is tbe cbaracter of exclusion determined by tbe perspective of wbiteness tbat underlies tbis question tbat is
tbe real problem, for tbe question presupposes a perspective of wbiteness, and tbis
perspective excludes and marginalizes tbe black experience. Tbus, tbe problem is
not of blacks, but one of whites, for it is tbey wbo reproduce and maintain tbe normalizing structures of wbiteness tbat make sucb a question possible.^ It is because
tbe dominant cultural understanding of race and racism is framed primarily by tbe
wbite perspective tbat tbe persistence of racial injustice becomes a problem. By
creating tbis sbift and redirecting tbe focus of tbe question back onto tbe questioners (wbo are presumably wbite), be bas drawn our attention to tbe existence and
consequences of wbiteness. Du Bois bere is deploying tbe concept of "wbiteness"
without naming it, and bis use of it suggests that he understands it to include the
practice of taking the perspective of those racialized as white in our society as the
norm. Du Bois is suggesting tbat it is only wben framed by tbe norms of whiteness
that sucb a question asked of blacks (i.e., "How does it feel to be a problem?") can
possibly be meaningful. But tben, once tbe normativity of wbiteness is unmasked,
tbe question's sense implodes. Once we see tbat tbe normativity of whiteness provides tbe grounds for tbe sense of tbe question, we also see tbat tbe question itself
no longer makes sense, for it is not blacks tbat are tbe problem but tbe norming of wbiteness itself tbat is. It is tbe presumption of tbe wbite perspective tbat
is problematic, not tbe mere presence of blacks in a society structured by wbite
supremacy.
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Double Consciousness: Black Identity and Whiteness
Even though in the first paragraph Du Bois exposes the presuppositions of
whiteness that frame the question of being a problem, and as a result shears away
its support so that the question is no longer coherent, in the second paragraph he
does admit that "being a problem is a strange experience . . ."{Souls, 7). Thus,
we are introduced to the double perspective of his analysis: on the one hand, his
analysis exposes the normative presuppositions of whiteness, and on the other
hand, his analysis expresses the conflicted experience of being imprisoned in the
marginalized, excluded, and subordinate position in a social order structured by
white supremacy. By articulating the experience of subordination and exclusion,
Du Bois gives voice to the racially marginalized and provides a critical perspective
on the presuppositions of whiteness. But more importantly, Du Bois introduces the
reader to the complexities of the experience of being racially oppressed. Du Bois
first articulates these complexities by asking: "Why did God make me an outcast
and a stranger in mine own house" {Souls, 8)? It is with this question that he first
expresses the experience of double consciousness. This ever-present experience of
double consciousness is a deeply conflicted soul, an experience he characterizes as
a two-ness: "An American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled
strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps
it from being torn asunder" {Souls, 8-9).
The passage that contains this description of double consciousness is in the
first chapter of Souls, entitled "Of Our Spiritual Strivings," which is a revised version of an earlier essay, "The Strivings of the Negro People," published in Atlantic
Monthly in 1897, which in turn is an evolutionary development of his famous talk
to the American Negro Academy, "The Conservation of Races," in March of that
same year.* While more often the continuities between these different versions have
been highlighted, Ernest Allen, Jr. argues that Du Bois's understanding of double
consciousness changed substantially from "Conservation" to Souls. In the earlier
essay, he argues that Du Bois had in mind an imaginary conflict between black and
white ideals, while in the later work Du Bois had in mind by double consciousness
a "negated black consciousness . . . resulting from the failure to" reconcile "American and Negro existential ideals. . . ."'' My interest here is only with the text of
Souls, so I will not examine Allen's arguments concerning these two different senses
of double consciousness, but I will return below to discuss his understanding of
double consciousness as an "absence of true self-consciousness" (Allen, 52).
In contrast to Allen's interpretation, Thomas Holt stays closer to the typical
understanding of this concept as a conflict between cultural ideals. On this orthodox interpretation of the concept of double consciousness, Du Bois captures the
fundamental contradiction that lies at the heart of the American racialized social
order. The contradiction lies between ideal and practice. On the one hand, American political ideals as enshrined in the Constitution ensure that all persons are
afforded equal rights and privileges, yet on the other hand, because the social order
governed by that constitution is racialized, those equal rights and privileges are
vigorously defended for some while they are systematically denied to others (or as
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Du Bois might have put it—reversing the perspective of whiteness—they are vigorously defended for others and systematically denied to some). That this contradiction is ever present in the history of the Republic is not difficult to see, from
tbe original justifications for cbattel slavery, to tbe so-called Great Compromise of
tbe Constitutional Convention of 1789, Jim Crow laws, federally endorsed bousing segregation, and tbe reversals of affirmative action policies in the past three
decades. A society that is fundamentally structured by racism, as is tbe U.S., is in
contradiction witb tbe ideals tbat ostensibly serve as its founding principles. Tbus,
one aspect of tbe concept of double consciousness is tbe illumination of tbis fundamental contradiction in our social order.
But Du Bois is not merely bringing to bis reader's attention tbe existence of
tbis contradiction in our social order. Indeed, be is also expressing bow this contradiction affects black identity. His pbenomenological description of tbe experience of being a black American is one of being conflicted and torn between tbe
so-called American ideals of freedom, equality, and individual dignity, whicb black
Americans rightly presume should apply to them, and the black experience of being
denied tbose ideals (sometimes in law, and sometimes in practice) by tbe order of
wbite supremacy that pervades every aspect of our collective life. Tbe experience
tbat results is one of both fitting in and not fitting in, being welcome and unwelcome, being celebrated and bated. So even wben tbe legal order formally permits
tbe full inclusion of blacks into American society, black Americans will continue
to feel (and be) alienated from tbat society because of a racialized culture tbat
continues to sustain de facto wbite supremacy. Tbe very celebration of Black History Montb itself symbolizes tbe marginalization of blacks in so-called American
culture, even tbougb blacks bave been integral to tbe development of tbat culture
from its origins. Tbis tension between being black and being "American" is always
present and deeply affects tbe self-consciousness of black Americans.
Tbe "twoness" of double consciousness is not merely a description of tbe
experience of living in a racialized society, but it also points to how tbis racialized
society structures and forms black identity. Du Bois analyzes tbe self-consciousness
of black Americans as a meditated consciousness: it is a "sense of always looking
at oneself tbrough tbe eyes of otbers" (Souls, 8). Tbe influence of Hegel on Du Bois's
tbougbt is clearly visible bere. In The Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel famously
argues tbat consciousness can only attain independent status as self-consciousness
througb tbe mediation of anotber consciousness.* It is only througb my consciousness being recognized by another consciousness tbat I attain a genuinely independent status as a self-consciousness, and wbat tbis means is tbat wbat I take to be
true, tbe subjective trutb tbat is tied to my perspective, is recognized as true by
anotber consciousness.' Since, according to Du Bois, the consciousness of black
Americans is a self-consciousness tbat is generated "througb the eyes of others,"
this analysis of black identity implies that it is dependent upon some otber identity.
And given bis otber remarks about double consciousness, it is clear tbat tbis otber
identity is wbite identity, wbicb dominates the formation of tbe social order.
Ernest Allen, Jr., bowever, interprets Du Bois quite differently on this point.
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He argues that what Du Bois means by "double consciousness" is that blacks in
fact lack genuine self-consciousness:
[W]hat Du Bois strictly meant by the phrase was the absence
of true self-consciousness on the part of black Americans, the
inability to recognize one's black self other than through the mediated veil of the unacknowledging white gaze. In this instance,
Du Bois' frame of reference can be traced ultimately to Hegel's
phenomenology, where true self-consciousness—supposedly lacking in the Negro—was dependent upon the mutual recognition of
human beings by one another (Allen, 52).'°
Allen's interpretation of Du Bois here is that true self-consciousness (i.e., the
development of an independent identity) can arise only on the basis of mutual
recognition. But the mutual recognition that results in the development of self-consciousness must be a mutual recognition between two equally-situated individuals. Since blacks are clearly not equally situated with respect to whites, being the
victims of a system of white domination, they cannot in fact achieve true self-consciousness (within the context of such a social system). The result is that blacks do
not achieve an independent identity. And, according to Allen, this is precisely what
Du Bois means by "double consciousness" in Souls.
If this is a correct reading of Allen's argument, then he misreads Hegel and,
consequently, Du Bois. Du Bois's grounding of black consciousness in mediation
through white consciousness does not entail that blacks fail to achieve self-consciousness. There are two main stages in this part of Hegel's analysis of the development of consciousness: in the first, consciousness develops into self-consciousness,
but only on the grounds of recognition by another consciousness; and in the second, self-consciousness achieves a genuinely objective point of view. When Du Bois
is writing at the beginning of the twentieth century, the self-development of Hegelian "Spirit" has not yet achieved genuine self-consciousness with its objective point
of view (and indeed the same can be said at the start of the twenty-first century),
thus only the first stage of this analysis is applicable here. In the first stage, consciousness realizes that it must look beyond its own subjective determinations, that
is, what counts as true for it, to another consciousness in order to have its (the first
consciousness's) determinations validated as true. What ensues, then, is a struggle
for recognition between two consciousnesses, with each demanding from the other
recognition for its own determinations and also for its conception of itself as an
independent consciousness: "Recognition can only come from an 'other' whom
one takes to be a self-conscious agent (an agent who has a point of view on the
world and therefore his own practical projects), and who confers that recognition
on one. Each therefore makes a conflicting demand on the other" (Pinkard, 57).
These conflicting demands are in fact contradictory demands; they cannot both
be satisfied at this point since each demands recognition for the truth of her point
of view exclusive of all others. Hegel understands this, then, as a life and death
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struggle, for it is about tbe existence of consciousness as an independently existing
self-consciousness witb a true point of view. But tbe victory of one consciousness
and tbe deatb of tbe otber will not solve tbe problem of recognition: "The struggle
is . . . not just over the satisfaction of desire but over wbat is to count as tbe objective point of view and tbus wbat is to count as tbe trutb" (Pinkard, 59). Tbe consequence is that one of the consciousnesses accepts defeat rather tban death and
confers tbe demanded recognition on to tbe otber. In tbis way, then, the conferral
of recognition can occur, rather tban tbe elimination of its possibility by tbe deatb
of one of tbe consciousnesses.
At tbis point in tbe development of self-consciousness, tbe subjective point
of view of one consciousness—in Hegel's terminology, tbe master—becomes dominant; its point of view is recognized and affirmed by tbe otber consciousness—tbe
slave—as determinative of truth. Thereby, tbe master's consciousness receives tbe
recognition it needs in order to assure itself tbat its subjective point of view is in
fact the objective point of view. On tbe otber band, tbe point of view of tbe slave's
consciousness is now determined by tbe projects of tbe master. Tbe field of botb
cognitive and affective values tbat it apprehends, which together direct its actions,
is now shaped by tbe projects, interests, and needs of tbe master; in other words,
tbe slave's point of view must now be integrated into the master's point of view
and made consistent with it:
Tbe slave . . . understands tbat bis desires count as good reasons
to act only to the extent tbat tbeir satisfaction can be integrated
into a scheme of satisfying tbe master's desires . . ., and be understands tbat the things of tbe world can count for bim as values or
as tbings to be appropriated by bim only insofar as such valuings
and appropriations can be integrated into the master's projects
and desires (Pinkard, 60).
On Pinkard's reading of tbis relationsbip, tbe slave's point of view becomes subordinated to tbe master's point of view only on tbe condition that tbe slave—as
a self-conscious agent—makes tbe cboice to accept the master's point of view as
determinative. To be sure, tbis is not an autonomous decision, but nonetbeless, tbe
recognition tbe master receives from tbe slave rests on the slave's conferral of that
recognition.
What tbis means, tben, is tbat "[t]be master's point of view thus proves to
bave no metapbysical or epistemological priority over tbe slave's point of view; its
dominance turns out to be a social fact" (Pinkard 60). Once tbe master realizes tbe
social contingency of tbe recognition sbe receives from tbe slave, sbe comes to see
tbat ber point of view has not been established as objective tbrougb its recognition
by anotber consciousness. Tbe contingently-grounded recognition tbat is conferred
in tbis dialectic fails to establisb tbe master's subjective point of view as objective
and true, and tbe master comes to realize tbat tbe dominance of ber point of view is
in fact mediated by, and bence dependent upon, tbe slave. Correlatively, tbe slave,
by apprebending that wbat be takes to be true (wbicb is determined by tbe proj-
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ects of tbe master) is grounded in the social contingency of tbe dialectical relationship between tbem, comes to see that the dominance tbe master has over bim (tbe
slave) is also a result of contingent, because tbey are social, circumstances. Hence,
botb master and slave come to realize tbat tbeir dominant and subordinate points
of view are a consequence of a contingent state of affairs, and tbis undermines tbe
point of tbe struggle for recognition: for self-consciousness to satisfy itself tbat its
subjective point of view is objective and true. A result of tbis failure of self-consciousness to assure itself of tbe complete and true objectivity of its point of view,
and bence of its own independence, botb master and slave come to realize that
eacb is dependent (tbougb in different ways) upon tbe otber.
But tbe dialectical development of tbe relation between master and slave does
not end bere. In tbe slave's coming to realize tbat be considers tbe master's point
of view to be legitimate on merely contingent grounds, tbe slave also comes to
realize tbat—for tbe same reasons—be in fact possesses a degree of independence.
By supporting the projects of tbe master througb working in tbe world, tbe slave
realizes tbat tbose projects are only possible on tbe basis of tbe slave's labors, tbus
"[t]o tbe extent tbat tbe slave comes to understand tbis—tbat be is a slave by contingency only and that bis own activity is also constitutive of sometbing's counting as a tbing of value—be sbeds tbe complete bold tbat tbe master bad over bis
self-consciousness" (Pinkard, 62)." In tbe end, tben, (and tbis is not truly the end
of tbe dialectic) the master and slave do not in fact find themselves in a simple
relation of dominance and subordination. Tbe master bas not acbieved complete
independence and recognition of ber point of view, and the slave is not fully dependent upon tbe master and does indeed possess a degree of independence bimself.
Wbat this sbows is that tbe original goal, full recognition and validation of one
of tbe two points of view, cannot be acbieved (at tbis stage). What is necessary,
tben, if tbe objective point of view and truth are still the goals, is to mutually construct a common point of view tbat can ground objectivity and trutb.'^ By means
of tbis dialectic, eacb self-consciousness reahzes tbat it must integrate tbe otber
into its own point of view: "Wbat counts as his own projects for tbe master cannot
be unambiguously identified witbout incorporating some reference to tbe slave's
projects and visa versa" (Pinkard, 62). At tbis point, a kind of mutual recognition
bas been acbieved wbere eacb self-consciousness sees the necessity of incorporating
aspects of tbe otber's point of view into its own, tbereby laying the foundation of a
genuinely intersubjective standpoint.
To be sure, a structure of domination and subordination continues to determine tbe relationsbip between tbe two self-consciousnesses. Tbis is one reason wby
it cannot be said tbat a truly objective point of view bas been acbieved. Nonetbeless, a certain degree of mutual recognition is unavoidable, entailing tbat eacb selfconsciousness is neitber entirely independent of, nor completely dependent upon,
tbe otber. And so wbile tbe master/slave relation of domination/subordination
remains, any degree of independence that eacb acbieves is grounded at tbe same
time on a relation of dependency upon tbe other.
Du Bois was tborougbly familiar witb Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, and
one can see tbe influences of tbe master/slave dialectic on bis conception of dou-
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ble consciousness.^^ For Du Bois, the double consciousness experienced by black
Americans is tbe "sense of always looking at one's self tbrougb tbe eyes of otbers,
of measuring one's soul by tbe tape and of a world tbat looks on in amused contempt and pity" (Souls, 8). Here we can clearly see tbe self-understanding of one
self-consciousness as mediated tbrougb anotber self-consciousness. Black identity
is mediated by wbite identity, tbat is, tbe ascriptive identity of blacks—how racial
others see them—plays a significant role in the formation of black self-understanding. How tbe Otber sees me shapes in central ways bow I see myself.
Returning to Allen's interpretation of double consciousness as a description of
"tbe absence of true self-consciousness on the part of black Americans, tbe inability
to recognize one's black self otber tban through the mediated veil of the unacknowledging wbite gaze" (Allen, 52), I want to suggest tbat tbis is a misreading of botb
Hegel and Du Bois. On Hegel's analysis of tbe master/slave dialectic, the achievement of a stable self-consciousness is possible only on tbe grounds of a mediation
of anotber consciousness. In otber words, my self-consciousness is possible only
insofar as it incorporates bow anotber consciousness views me; tbis mutual recognition of two consciousnesses is necessary for tbe formation of self-consciousness.
Tbus, it is difficult to see bow black consciousness, by unavoidably being mediated
by wbite consciousness, fails to acbieve true self-consciousness; on tbe Hegelian
analysis, tbis is tbe only way self-consciousness is possible. Moreover, tbe HegeHan
analysis also entails tbat wbite consciousness is mediated by black consciousness;
tbat is, white identity is sbaped in a significant manner by how blacks view them
(See, e.g., Morrison).
To be sure, Allen is correct insofar as Du Bois does say tbat blacks are denied
true self-consciousness: "the Negro is a sort of seventb son, born witb a veil, and
gifted with second-sigbt in tbis American world—a world wbicb yields bim no true
self-consciousness, but only lets bim see bimself tbrougb the revelation of tbe otber
world" (Souls, 8). But I want to suggest tbat wbat Du Bois means bere is tbat tbere
is an asymmetry between tbe development of black and white self-consciousnesses,
yet at the same time botb self-consciousnesses are mediated tbrougb tbe otber. A
genuinely objective self-consciousness, according to Hegel, rests on tbe construction of a common, intersubjective point of view, and tbis necessarily rests on a
certain degree of reciprocity. Tbis degree of reciprocity, bowever, is lacking at tbis
stage in history since there is a fundamental asymmetry in tbe socially structured
relations between black and wbites. In otber words, tbe mediation of consciousness for black Americans is problematic precisely because tbe mediation itself is
framed by a social system tbat is cbaracterized by white supremacy. As Du Bois
wants to sbow, it becomes problematic wben one considers tbe development of
self-consciousness witbin a social context structured by an asymmetrical bierarcby of race. Tbe particular form of mediated consciousness tbat black Americans
experience is structured by a bierarchical social order of domination and subordination. Mediated consciousness in tbis context is problematic because tbe subordinated consciousness is not recognized to be an independently existing agent by tbe
dominating consciousness, and so it is: blacks bave not been recognized as fully
independent agents by tbe dominant American culture. (Yet, conversely, whites'
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self-consciousness also fails to acbieve true independence.) Tbus, black American
identity is mediated tbrougb tbe consciousness of tbe Otber, in tbis case wbites. The
consciousness of whites, or as Du Bois would articulate it, "white souls," is defined
by "wbiteness." Wbat makes a consciousness a specifically white consciousness
is that it is a racialized consciousness witb a particular point of view. Tbis point
of view can be defined in terms of tbe interests, needs, and values of tbat consciousness. Du Bois's distinction between black and wbite consciousnesses, tben,
can be understood as drawing attention to tbe differently situated standpoints of
eacb form of consciousness. Tbus, in addition to elaborating black consciousness,
Du Bois identifies whiteness as tbe essential meaning of white consciousness, as
well as whiteness as tbe dominant term in tbe bierarcbical structuring of the U.S.
social formation.
How, tben, does Du Bois understand tbe implications of tbis double consciousness for black identity? The nature of double consciousness, according to Du Bois,
seems to require black Americans to cboose one of tbeir two identities: to eitber,
following Frederick Douglass and Booker T. Washington, renounce their African
heritage and assimilate into "Americanness," or, following Alexander Crummell,
adopt an afrocentric stance by forgoing tbeir Americanness and turning toward
their African roots. But baving to cboose between tbese options is unsatisfactory for
Du Bois, because it is a false dilemma: "[The black American] would not Africanize
America, for America bas too mucb to teacb tbe world and Africa. He would not
bleacb bis Negro soul in a flood of wbite Americanism, for be knows tbat Negro
blood bas a message for tbe world" (Souls, 9). Tbe solution tbat Du Bois suggests is
a pluralistic, multicultural America in wbicb African-Americans can be botb black
and American, an America in whicb being American does not mean subscribing to
tbe norms of wbiteness. Tbus, Du Bois is again offering an implicit critique of tbe
begemonic norming of wbite interests, needs, and values in tbe society and culture
of tbe United States. Tbe "twoness" of being botb black and American is problematic only in a context of wbite supremacy; dismantling wbite supremacy does not
rid us of tbe categories "black" and "American," or of tbeir cultural content, but
wbat tben becomes possible is a sociocultural pluralism tbat does not embody tbe
norms of wbiteness as dominant.
I argue tbat, in effect, wbat tbe concept of double consciousness describes is
the consequence of tbe confiict—a struggle for recognition—between wbiteness and
blackness. In a racialized social order, tbis conflict is not one of equals but a confiict
between tbe dominant and tbe subordinate, tbus it is a conflict tbat is bierarcbical and asymmetrical. Tbe sociocultural norming of wbiteness takes tbe interests,
needs, and values of whites as the standard and all other interests, needs, and values as deviant from tbe norm. Tbese interests, needs, and values of wbites are tbe
distillate of a contingent bistory—just as in tbe master/slave dialectic, botb master
and slave come to realize tbat tbe recognition tbey receive from tbe otber is only
contingently motivated—and tbey are maintained by social practices, tbus tbis is
not an essentializing description of wbites. Normalizing tbe point of view or standpoint of wbites constitutes an immense degree of power, for tbe effects of normalization remain largely unrecognized by tbe dominant culture. As bas been discussed
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extensively in tbe literature on wbiteness, tbe normalization of wbiteness is largely
a transparent phenomenon. That is, whites typically are not conscious of how tbeir
own perspective has been normalized and tbat tbis normalization generates a set of
racial privileges of wbich tbey remain unaware. Wbat is especially notewortby here
is tbat tbe relation between wbiteness and blackness becomes a problematic conflict
only when tbey are situated bierarchically in relation to eacb otber.
Du Bois not only tbeorized and described tbe development of black self-consciousness (and concomitantiy, wbiteness), but he also engaged in interventions
in tbis developmental process, of wbicb bis editorsbip of The Crisis is a prime
example. Tbere is another intervention of bis tbat illustrates botb tbe concept of
double consciousness and tbe dialectical development of self-consciousness. In
1900, Du Bois assembled a series of pbotograpbs to be exbibited at tbe "American Negro" exbibit of tbe Paris Fxposition." As Shawn Micbelle Smitb argues,
Du Bois used tbis collection of pbotograpbs to "disrupt tbe images of African
Americans produced 'tbrougb tbe eyes of otbers' by simultaneously reproducing
and supplanting these images with a different vision of tbe 'American Negro' "
(Smitb, 581). Tbese images were presented as contemporary portraits of African
Americans, but their style, format, and the subjects' poses suggested criminal mug
sbots: "wben projected trougb the eyes of wbite others, the image of tbe African
American middle-class individual often transmuted into tbe mug sbot of an African
American criminal" (Smitb, 585). Smith's argument is that witb tbese pbotograpbs,
Du Bois unmasks and cballenges tbe normalizing gaze of whiteness tbat sbapes
African American identity formation. In Hegelian terms, Du Bois's Paris Exbibition
pbotographs challenge tbe dominant (master) self-consciousness as an independent
consciousness, for they "trouble" the self-assurance of tbe dominant consciousness:
"Tbe pbotograpbs begin to disrupt tbe authority of tbe wbite observers by collapsing tbe distance between viewers and objects under view tbat is beld traditionally to empower observers" (Smitb, 587). Moreover, in the Paris Exbibition
pbotograpbs, Du Bois expresses tbe self-understanding of blacks tbat tbey are not
entirely dependent upon tbe dominant consciousness (i.e., wbiteness). Tbereby tbe
dialectical development of wbite and black self-consciousness arrives at tbe stage
of tbe necessity of mutual recognition. Tbus, in tbe same period as tbe writing of
Souls, Du Bois can be seen enacting the Hegelian dialectical development of selfconsciousness. Smith's understanding of the significance of the Paris Exposition
pbotograpbs reinforces tbe argument that in Souls Du Bois is presupposing and
binting at an understanding of whiteness as a sociostructural pattern of domination tbat sbapes both wbite and black consciousness.
Finally, it is wortb noting that the social situation of wbite supremacy tbat
Du Bois sees as the ground for double consciousness is structured analogously to
tbe proletariat/bourgeois structure described by Marx." Wbat is relevant about
tbis structure, in wbicb one term identifies tbe socially dominant group and tbe
otber term identifies tbe dominated or oppressed group, is tbat for Marx as well as
later Marxist tbeorists tbe oppressed group (tbe proletariat in bis case) possessed
a unique insigbt into tbe true operations of the social order, wbereas tbe dominating group tends to be blinded to certain trutbs about tbeir social situation."' Thus,
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tbe fact of double-consciousness does not refer merely to tbe structuring of black
identity, but also to tbe capacity of blacks to understand tbe true nature of tbe
social formation. In Tbomas Holt's analysis of tbe alienation of blacks in Du Bois's
work during tbis period, tbis alienation sbould be celebrated for tbe reason tbat
since "tbey live in two worlds at once, African-Americans possess the power to see
where others are blind" (Holt, 306). Tbe value of the alienation generated by double consciousness is also recognized in Ernest Allen, Jr.'s interpretation of Du Bois's
reference to blacks' "second sigbt." Allen argues tbat "Du Bois may bave implied
by [second sight] 'an expanded consciousness allowing one that ability to navigate
two disparate cultures fiuently . . . or from tbe perspective of one's own culture,
tbe skill to perceive in anotber tbat wbicb is opaque to its practitioners.' "''^ Here,
Allen seems to clearly sbare my reading of at least tbe implications of tbe second
sigbt of double consciousness, altbougb Allen's interpretation rests on distinguisbing Du Bois's uses of "double consciousness," "twoness," and "second sigbt" in a
way tbat I do not. Nonetbeless, tbe point bere is that tbe concept of double consciousness is not merely one of situating two different perspectives, standpoints, or
worldviews in relation to one anotber, but tbat tbe tbese two "worlds" are bierarcbically situated witb respect to one anotber in tbeir sbared social formation; a consequence of tbis is tbat tbe lower term in tbe hierarcby, tbe dominated or oppressed
group, possesses a truer understanding of tbe operations of tbe social order tban
does tbe bigber term in tbe bierarcby, the dominating or dominant group.

The Veil between Blackness and Whiteness
Tbrougbout Souls Du Bois describes black Americans as living bebind wbat
be calls a Veil. Part of tbe work tbat the figure of tbe Veil does is to describe the
marginalizaton of blacks in American society and culture, tbat is, bow tbere is a
barrier or gap between black and wbite experience. For example, Du Bois discusses
in Souls bis encountering tbe Veil as a scbool teacber in rural Tennessee. Wben be
interviews for bis first posting be describes bow tbe "sbadow of tbe Veil" falls wben
be eats dinner at tbe bome of tbe wbite scbool commissioner and bis wife (Souls,
51). Although in words be is treated respectfully and invited to stay for dinner, be
is required to eat after tbe commissioner and bis wife, and alone. Here, Du Bois is
marginalized by tbe practices of tbe wbites be encounters because of bis racialized
blackness, even tbough be is at tbe same time treated witb tbe respect due a bigbly
qualified teacber. Tbe respect be receives because of bis status as a teacber is a bollow form of respect, a respect in form only. Its boUowness derives from its being
constrained and limited jointly by tbe facts of bis blackness and tbe sociocultural
structures of wbiteness. Tbese two facts jointly prohibit tbe bestowing of a substantively meaningful respect. Consequently, Du Bois understands tbis incident as an
example of bow tbe Veil bangs between blacks and opportunity, despite tbeir best
efforts at self-improvement (Souls, 54). Tbe figure of tbe Veil describes tbe invisible
barrier—wbiteness—between blacks and wbites in tbis wbite supremacist culture
and, further, bow tbis barrier is a substantive barrier to meaningful equality.
Du Bois also uses this figure in contexts where he wants to emphasize tbat
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blacks are not similarly situated as wbites witb respect to tbe dominant culture,
that tbere is an asymmetry in tbe structure of mutual recognition. Understood in
this way, the Veil draws attention to the asymmetrical positioning of blackness
to whiteness, of black self-consciousness to wbite self-consciousness. In common
usage, a veil is something that is intended to be placed over sometbing tbat sbould
be covered. In marriage ceremonies and Muslim culture, veils are used to bide
women's faces in public. In tbis sense, veils are used to cover sometbing tbat sbould
remain bidden. Veils are placed (or worn) intentionally, and tbey place sometbing
out of sigbt wben in a public space. Understood in tbis way, tben, tbe Veil tbat
Du Bois speaks of is intentionally placed and used to hide sometbing tbat sbould
not be seen in public. Tbe Veil is an effect of tbe bistory of wbite supremacy in
tbe U.S., wbich is a consequence of the bistory of enslavement, exploitation, and
oppression of blacks for material and psychological gain. In his choice of tbe metaphor of tbe Veil, Du Bois suggests tbat tbe oppressive structures that continue to
inhibit equitable opportunities for blacks bave been willfully constructed and are
intentionally maintained. Furtbermore, tbe Veil tbat covers blacks is intended to
make tbem (blacks) invisible to tbe public, wbere the public is cbaracteristically a
wbite public. As Ralpb Ellison bas so eloquently described, being black in America is tbe experience of being invisible.^^ By functioning to cover, marginalize, and
make invisible blacks and black consciousness, tbe Veil is whiteness, wbere wbiteness defines tbe raciahzed norms of what can and should be seen. As a metapbor
for whiteness, tbe Veil places out of sigbt to tbe dominant culture the lives and
experiences of blacks. In otber words, tbe interests, needs, and values of blacks
are ensbrouded and removed from public notice, consideration, and valuing. Note
that Du Bois utilizes the trope of the Veil to draw attention to whiteness because
he cannot name whiteness directly. For if be were to name wbiteness, bis wbite
readersbip (see below) would fail to see tbis wbiteness because of the psycbo-social
mecbanisms tbat operate to defend one's position and status in tbe world.''
Moreover, veils can bave positive, constructive aspects.^" Tbey can clear a
space for tbe construction of alternative identities—especially identities tbat are
non-ascriptive and resistant—and tbey can form sites for subversion of tbe dominant order. Du Bois seems to allude to tbis aspect in bis metapbor of tbe Veil as
well. Wben describing tbe nature of tbe book in "Tbe Forethougbt," be says,
" [l]eaving, tben tbe world of tbe wbite man, I have stepped witbin tbe Veil, raising
it that you may view faintly its deeper recesses,—tbe meaning of its religion, tbe
passion of its buman sorrow, and tbe struggle of its greater souls" (Souls, 3). Here
we see Du Bois bighligbting the piety, virtues, strengtbs, and creativity of black
folk, sometbing he returns to repeatedly througbout bis career, especially in The
Gift of Black Folk.^^ His purpose is not simply to uncover for bis wbite readers tbe
suffering of blacks caused by tbe system of white supremacy, but at least as importantly to make visible and immediate to bis wbite readers tbe bumanity of blacks.
In particular, be wants to sbow that blacks possess tbe specifically buman cbaracteristic of moral agency tbat is denied by tbe ideology of wbite supremacy.
But tbe Veil does more tban ensbroud tbe "souls of black folk" from the view
of wbites. By doing so, it also functions to inbibit an awareness by wbites of tbe
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implicit norming of wbiteness. Wben black souls are out of sigbt and are not considered part of tbe social spbere, tben tbe perspective of wbites becomes tbe only
apparent perspective available for wbites. Tbis masks tbe norming of tbe perspective itself; wbiteness itself becomes invisible. Altbougb this invisibility is a central
property cited by contemporary tbeorists of wbiteness, tbere is some disagreement
about it. Barbara Flagg, for example, bas argued tbat this "transparency" of whiteness is one of its essential properties.-^^ Ruth Frankenberg, bowever, argues tbat
wbiteness is eminently visible since it fundamentally structures tbe social and cultural worlds.^^ Wbat I suggest is that wbat are visible are indeed tbe norms of
wbiteness, but wbat remains invisible is tbe very fact tbat tbese norms are norms of
whiteness. Tbus, it is tbe content of wbiteness tbat is visible and tbe functioning of
wbiteness witbin tbe social order tbat remains invisible (to wbites). In bis example,
Du Bois's bosts understood tbey were marginalizing bim and bis interests, but tbey
did not understand tbat tbeir actions normalized tbemselves and their own interests, thus supporting a white supremacist social order. Because of the operations of
wbiteness and its generation of epistemic norms (among otbers), bis bosts did not
understand and recognize tbe wbiteness in their presuppositions. Tbeir bebavior
was "normal" for wbites, and tbus went (largely) unquestioned and unexamined.
Tbus, it is tbe content of wbiteness (tbe norms tbemselves) tbat is visible and tbe
function and operations of wbiteness witbin tbe social order tbat remain invisible
(especially to wbites).
Tbus, it is my claim tbat in Souls Du Bois implicitly understood wbiteness and
bow it functions to maintain a social system infected witb wbite supremacy. Tbe
metapbor of tbe Veil perbaps comes closest to naming wbiteness for what it is; tbe
Veil is wbiteness, at least it bas the same functional role in tbe social order as does
wbiteness.

Du Bois's White Readers
In examining tbe evolution of Du Bois's ideas from "Tbe Conservation of
Races" (1897) througb "Tbe Strivings of tbe Negro People" (1897) to "Of Our
Spiritual Strivings" (1903), Tbomas Holt notes tbat "Conservation" was "addressed
to a black audience; indeed, it is an exbortation to the 'talented tenth' for selfappointed racial leadership," wbile the opening essay of Souls was addressed "primarily to a wbite audience" (Holt, 303). Yet Holt must presume the self-evident
nature of tbis second claim since be does not provide eitber textual or contextual
evidence for it. Regardless of its obviousness, I suggest tbat tbe conceptual content
of Souls implies tbat tbe primary function of tbe work is to inform, and to raise tbe
consciousness of, wbites concerning tbe nature of whiteness and its structuring of
the social order. To be sure, Du Bois acbieves tbis indirectly tbrougb discussions of
tbe meaning of being a "problem," tbe concept of double consciousness, and tbe
metapbor of tbe Veil.
By describing tbe marginalization of tbe black experience as being veiled,
Du Bois makes visible one of tbe central mecbanisms by wbicb racial inequality is
maintained in social practices, in institutions, and in cultural representations. But
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in Souls Du Bois means to go beyond merely describing this mechanism of racial
oppression. The explicit purpose of the work is to sketch the depth and complexity
of the souls that live behind the Veil. By doing this, he provides a picture of what
lies behind the Veil, thus rendering the veiling ineffective. If this is a correct depiction of Du Bois's intentions, then the implication is that Du Bois was writing Souls
primarily for a white readership (or, more precisely, for a readership that had internalized whiteness, whatever their racialized identity).
In Souls he makes public precisely what the Veil is intended to keep from public view. In practice, this means describing the various aspects of blackness in contrast to the dominant figure of whiteness and making blackness visible to whites.
In this way, Du Bois disrupts the power of whiteness to evade the question of the
humanity of blacks by expressing what typically remains unspoken. Whiteness
functions by means of a hegemonic domination of the social and cultural world,
and by definition this hegemony marginalizes the very existence of blackness. By
articulating the experience of blackness, Du Bois finds a way to undercut the hegemonic power of whiteness. The depiction of black experience for a white audience disrupts the comprehensiveness and normalcy of the white perspective. Once
whiteness loses its hegemonic grip on social practices and institutions and cultural
representations, its ability to reproduce itself is problematized.
But merely articulating the experience of an Other will not necessarily disrupt the structures that maintain the asymmetrical relations between self and other.
Du Bois's text recognizes this and seeks to point to—if indirectly—the existence and
operations of whiteness that function to reproduce and maintain the asymmetrical
relations between whites and blacks. The significance of Souls, then, is not so much
in its original depiction of blackness, but in its unveiling before a white readership
of the norming of presuppositions of whiteness. Making such taken-for-granted
norms visible undercuts their effectiveness, for whiteness functions so effectively at
maintaining the white supremacist social order precisely because its norming of the
interests, needs, and values of whites is transparent to whites. Thus, embedded in
the text are hints, suggestions, images, indirect references, associations, and so on
that direct the reader's attention to the existence of a sociocultural whiteness and
how it functions to maintain a racially unjust social order. Without directly identifying the hegemony of whiteness as his target, Du Bois finds a way in Souls to
explain how whiteness functions and thereby to undermine its effectiveness.

Conclusions
I have argued that, despite its express focus on the black experience, in Souls
Du Bois is also unmasking, analyzing, and critiquing sociostructural whiteness. If
I am correct, then Du Bois was developing an understanding of whiteness even
earlier than in his more famous references to it in Black Reconstruction and "The
Souls of White Folk." His analysis of the problem of the color line in America is
unique in a variety of ways, but it is most constructive in its re-articulation of tbe
perspective from which race is understood. The supreme value of Souls is found in
its identification and disruption of the presuppositions that define the sociocultural
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location whiteness. His analysis and critique of whiteness remains relevant today
because tbe persistence of racial injustice in tbe face of a public ideology of inclusiveness and equality requires explanation, and I would argue that understanding
the norming of tbe presuppositions of wbiteness can provide tbe necessary explanation. Du Bois insightfully sees that racial injustices rest in fundamental ways on
unarticulated and often unconscious presuppositions tbat underlie and frame sociocultural norms.
The lessons taugbt by Du Bois here are lessons tbat in many ways we still
bave not learned. In many respects, tbe problem of racial injustice is still seen to
be a problem of people of color or of blackness, and not a problem tbat centrally
involves wbites and whiteness. Tbinking of tbe problem of race as one that concerns
only people of color presumes a normed perspective of wbiteness, and understanding this is crucial to developing a deeper and more effective analysis of sociocultural
racialization processes. Moreover, understanding tbat tbe black experience is complicated by a double consciousness is important for decentering tbe norms of wbiteness. Wben wbiteness functions as tbe unarticulated and unacknowledged norm,
groups tbat possess differing interests, needs, and values will be marginalized in
invisible ways (tbougb often invisible only to tbe dominant group). Tbe persistence
of broad and deep racial inequalities can best be explained, I would argue, by tbe
normative functions of wbiteness in our social practices, institutions, and cultural
representations. Tbe effect of tbe norming of wbiteness is tbe marginalization of
blackness. Tbe contributing causes of tbis marginalization will not be identified (and
bence disrupted) unless wbiteness itself is acknowledged and analyzed. Finally, seeing bow wbiteness functions as a set of norms tbat structure social and cultural life
is necessary if we are to make visible tbose tbat are structurally rendered invisible.
Not only pointing out tbe existence of tbe Veil, but also lifting and eliminating it, is
essential if tbe racially marginalized and excluded are to exercise an effective voice
in tbeir own self-determination. Wbites continue to be largely unconscious of their
racial privileges, wbicb are exhibited in all aspects of tbe modern social world. Tbe
fact tbat public discussions of tbe very existence of wbite privilege continue to be
very controversial and divisive is evidence tbat tbe normativity of wbiteness remains
unacknowledged and powerfully begemonic. Du Bois's contribution is to begin tbe
lifting of tbe Veil and to give a voice to tbose wbo exist under its shadow so tbat
tbe Veil itself can be cballenged and deconstructed. Tbis remains necessary insofar
as black Americans, as well as otber Americans of color, continue to be rendered
largely invisible and marginalized by tbe wbiteness that colors tbe social order. In
tbese ways, Du Bois bas provided us in The Souls of Black Folk witb an early, yet
still relevant to us today, glimpse of tbe nature and functioning of whiteness.
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See G, W E Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, tr, A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), Section B.IV.A: "Independence and Dependence of Self-consciousness: Lordship and Bondage," 111-19.
9.
Terry Pinkard, Hegel's Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason (Gambridge: Gambridge University Press, 1994), 55-59. My understanding of Hegel throughout follows
Pinkard's clear and compelling interpretation in Hegel's Phenomenology. Henceforth
cited as Pinkard.
10. Allen cites S. Adell, Double Consciousness/Double Blind: Theoretical Issues in TwentiethCentury Black Literature (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994).
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